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I. Introduction
One of the oil spill response methods approved by the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) is the use of dispersants.  Dispersants are 
chemicals that physically break apart oil slicks into smaller oil droplets so 
that the oil can be easily broken down.1  These chemicals, however, vary in 
effectiveness and toxicity.  Although there has been much research into the 
effects of dispersants and the development of less toxic variants, there is no 
scientific or environmental consensus on whether or not dispersant use is a 
viable or environmentally sustainable method of responding to an oil spill. 
This paper examines the historical use of dispersants in oil spill responses, 
the controversy behind their use, and the legal framework that provides for 
their use.  Finally, a new legal framework is proposed in light of the recent 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 
II. The Science behind Dispersants
A. Why Use Dispersants in an Oil Spill Response?
There is no consensus on the best way to clean up an oil spill. 
According to the law of conservation of mass, matter can neither be created 
nor destroyed.  It can, however, be rearranged in the confines of a closed 
system.  When an oil spill occurs on the surface of the ocean inside the 
closed system of the Earth and its atmosphere, the oil simply has to go 
somewhere.  The questions researchers are trying to answer are where 
should the oil go and in what form. 
It is well known that oil and water do not mix.2  Known methods of 
removing oil from the surface of the ocean include chemical, biological, and 
1. R.R. Lessard & G. Demarco, The Significance of Oil Spill Dispersants, 6 Spill
Science & Technology Bulletin 59, 60 (2000). 
2. In order for liquids to mix, their bonds must be broken and new bonds are
formed between the two liquids. Since water has stronger bonds than oil, it is 
energetically unfavorable for them to mix. This is also known as the ‘Like Dissolves 
Like Rule.’ See Kenneth J. Williamson, Macroscale and Microscale Organic Experiments 40 
(2nd ed. 1994).  
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mechanical techniques.  Mechanical techniques include skimming the oil off 
of the ocean’s surface using skimmers, booms, or the use of sorbent 
materials.3  Biological techniques utilize the various microorganisms that 
are known to naturally biodegrade oil by either their addition or the 
introduction of fertilizers to seed their growth, or both, to the area of a spill.4  
Both aforementioned techniques, however, are inherently limited.  For 
example, mechanical methods of oil removal are problematic where the slick 
is spread over a vast area.  Large amounts of resources and manpower are 
required to recover the oil in a timely manner.  Biological methods are 
problematic because the small-scale microorganisms can only biodegrade 
the oil to which they have access.  Since the only accessible portion of the 
oil is that which lies at the oil-water interface, biodegradation can be highly 
time consuming where slicks have surface areas on the scale of hundreds of 
square miles. 
These limitations can be overcome by the use of dispersants. 
Dispersants consist of surfactants that are dissolved in one or more 
solvents, and are therefore included in the chemical category of oil spill 
response techniques.5  Surfactants, also known as surface active chemicals, 
consist of elongated molecules having endpoints with different properties.6  
One end is hydrophilic, or water loving, while the other is hydrophobic, or 
water repelling.7  The result of applying a dispersant to an oil slick on the 
ocean’s surface is the reduction of the surface tension of the oil-water 
interface.8  This phenomenon converts the monolithic oil slick into vast 
amounts of smaller oil droplets which drastically increases the surface-area-
to-volume ratio of the oil.9  Thus, the microscopic organisms that are able to 
biodegrade the oil now have greater access to it, thereby significantly 
reducing the time necessary to eliminate the contents of a spill.10  This 
benefit, however, can only occur if a sufficient population of such organisms 
is present at the site of a spill.11  Thus, the larger the spill, the greater the 
number of organisms required to biodegrade the oil. 
3. U.S. EPA, Section on Spill Response Techniques,  http://www.epa.gov/
osweroe1/content/learning/oiltech.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
4. Id.
5. Lessard & Demarco, supra note 1, at 60.
6. Id.
7. G.P. Canevari, Some Observations on the Mechanism and Chemistry Aspects of
Chemical Dispersion, Chemical Dispersants for the Control of Oil Spills, American Society for 
Testing and Materials 5, 6 (1978). 
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id. at 12.
10. Id. at 12.
11. Ian MacDonald, Professor of Biological Oceanography, Address at Florida
State University: Energy, Oil, Emissions and the Future of Florida (Sep. 21, 2010). 
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Despite overcoming the limitations of mechanical and biological oil 
spill response methods, chemical methods, such as the application of 
dispersants, are also limited.  The chemicals themselves can be highly toxic 
to the very marine environment in which they are being introduced.  Recall 
the law of conservation of mass.  Just as the oil has to go somewhere, the 
dispersant and the resulting oil-dispersant mixture have to go somewhere as 
well.  A great analogy is mixing solid sugar into tea.12  It may no longer be 
visible, but it is still there and able to cause harm (e.g., tooth decay).13  The 
effectiveness and toxicity of the use of dispersants in an oil spill response is 
still a subject of major scientific inquiry and controversy.  This paper will 
explore this controversy and the legal framework of dispersant use in oil 
spill responses in the context of the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Rig disaster. 
B. Dispersant Controversy
Determination of the toxicity of dispersants is a complicated task.  One 
must consider not only the toxicity of the dispersant chemicals themselves, 
but the toxicity of the dispersant-oil mixture and the toxicity of the eventual 
small-scale oil droplets themselves.  Therefore, to fully understand why the 
use of dispersants in oil spill responses is still controversial today, it is 
important to first understand the factors that contribute to their 
effectiveness.  Dispersant application is not the ideal response for each and 
every oil spill.  The most significant damage caused by oil spills has 
occurred when oil enters the near-shore or intertidal zones.14  Therefore, the 
use of dispersants is most desirable in the open sea and in high sea-energy 
conditions.  High sea-energy conditions refer to the water’s ability to 
mechanically distribute the oil droplets throughout the water column.  For 
example, high winds, rough waves, and strong currents can themselves, or in 
combination, spread the oil droplets out over large areas.15  Conversely, if 
low sea-energy conditions are present, the dispersant-oil mixture may not 
be diluted in the water column very well. 
Extremely thick and viscous oils are by far the most difficult to 
disperse.  In fact, the longer crude oil is exposed to the elements, the more 
viscous it becomes.16  This is due to the loss of the more volatile 
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. A. Lewis & D. Aurand, Putting Dispersants to Work: Overcoming Obstacles, API
Publication Number 4562A, Washington, DC (1997). 
15. Lessard & Demarco, supra note 1, at 61.
16. Richard A. Kerr, As Oil Becomes ‘Mousse’ Then ‘Tarballs,’ Chemistry Could
Determine Coast’s Fate, SCIENCE INSIDER, May 3, 2010, http://news.sciencemag.org/ 
scienceinsider/2010/05/as-oil-becomes-mousse-then-tarb.html. 
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components.17  As exposure time to the seawater increases, the crude oil 
emulsifies, or forms what is known as a mousse.18  Since a mousse is too 
viscous to disperse, there is what is known as a “window of opportunity,” or 
a limited amount of time in which dispersant use can even be considered.19  
This time frame can vary from merely a few hours to a few weeks depending 
on the viscosity of the oil and the strength of the dispersant.20  Thus, this 
proverbial ticking of the clock can perhaps be the biggest impairment to 
dispersant effectiveness. 
It is the trade-off between effectiveness and toxicity that is at the heart 
of the dispersant controversy.21  The oil droplets that are formed by the 
dispersants themselves are still just as toxic as before the application of any 
dispersants.  In fact, some argue that the net effect of dispersing the oil is 
even more toxic because the now smaller droplets can more easily enter the 
systems of marine life.22  Instead of a slick of oil floating on just the surface 
of the water, the same amount of oil is now dispersed throughout the water 
column in what is still a relatively small area, depending on the amount of 
time it takes for the droplets to spread throughout the water column.  Since 
this time is dependent of the sea energy, the efficiency of dispersants in 
actual spills is not an exact science.23  This, however, creates the issues that 
environmental groups are most worried about.  One issue is for just how 
long is marine life exposed to the initially high concentration of small-scale 
oil droplets and dispersants.  Once this threshold question can be 
answered, the next question is under what conditions dispersants should 
then be used, if at all. 
C. Use of Dispersants to Date
If the use of dispersants was an exact science, then the controversy 
over the trade-off between toxicity and effectiveness would dissolve one way 
or another.  For now, however, we can explore the effects of dispersants that 
have been used in the cleanup of past oil spills thus far and how it can effect 
decision making today. 
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Lessard & Demarco, supra note 1, at 62.
20. Id.
21. Merv Fingas, Prince William Sound Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council, A
Review of Literature Related to Oil Spill Dispersants 1997-2008, iii (2008), http://www. 
pwsrcac.org/docs/d0053000.pdf.  
22. Amanda Mascarelli, Debate Grows Over Impact of Dispersed Oil, NATURE NEWS, 
July 10, 2010, http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100710/full/news.2010.347.html. 
23. Fingas, supra note 21, at 34.
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Some countries have routinely used dispersants since the 1960s.24  In 
nearly all cases, however, toxic dispersants were used in the responses to 
small-scale coastal oil spills.25  It was their role in the Torrey Canyon oil spill 
and the resulting damage to the environment which sparked public aversion 
to the use of dispersants in oil spill responses.26  The Torrey Canyon was an oil 
tanker which ran aground off the western coast of Cornwall, England on 
March 18, 1967.27  According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Association (“NOAA”), approximately 36,100,000 gallons of crude oil were 
released into the sea.28  In the immediate aftermath, a panel of scientific 
experts was established to examine the proposed cleanup procedure.29  A 
mere twelve hours after the spill, the Royal Navy sprayed BP1002 dispersant 
onto the oil slick.30  As a result of the aforementioned environmental 
backlash, there was a push to develop less toxic dispersants.31 
Since the Torrey Canyon spill, dispersants have been used in oil spill 
responses over 213 times in the past fourty years in locations around the 
world.32  One of the most notable oil spills in that time period was the Exxon 
Valdez tanker spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska.  On March 24, 1989, the 
Exxon Valdez vessel released 10.9 million gallons of crude oil when it ran 
aground, striking Prince William Sound’s Bligh Reef.33  According to 
response documents, five aircraft dispersant trials using COREXIT 9527 
dispersant were conducted from March 25-28.34  However, on March 26, the 
very same day that permission was granted to use dispersants, a severe 
24. Lessard & Demarco, supra note 1, at 60.
25. Patrick Barkham, Oil Spills: Legacy of the Torrey Canyon, GUARDIAN, June 24,
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jun/24/torrey-canyon-oil-spill-
deepwater-bp. 
26. Lessard & Demarco, supra note 1, at 60.
27. NOAA Incident News, http://www.incidentnews.gov/incident/6201 (last
visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Patrick Barkham, Oil Spills: Legacy of the Torrey Canyon, GUARDIAN, June 24,
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jun/24/torrey-canyon-oil-spill-
deepwater-bp.  This dispersant was manufactured by British Petroleum (now BP). 
31. Etkin, D.S., Factors in the Dispersant Use Decision-Making Process: Historical
Overview and Look to the Future, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ARCTIC AND MARINE
OILSPILL PROGRAM TECHNICAL SEMINAR  281, 287 (1998) http://www.environmental-
research.com/erc_papers/ERC_paper_27.pdf. 
32. Alexis Steen & Abigail Findlay, 2008 OIL SPILL CONFERENCE, FREQUENCY OF
DISPERSANT USE WORLDWIDE, 646 (2008), http://www.iosc.org/papers/2008%20108.pdf. 
33. NOAA Incident News, http://www.incidentnews.gov/incident/6683 (last
visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
34. NOAA Incident News, http://www.incidentnews.gov/entry/515612 (last
visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
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storm emulsified a large quantity of the discharged oil.35  Therefore, on 
March 29, the Regional Response Team (“RRT”) abandoned the use of 
dispersants.36  
Many reports of adverse health effects on the responders were 
reported and even linked to COREXIT 9527 and the ingredient 2-
Butoxyethanol.37  The Materials Safety Data Sheet (“MSDS”) for COREXIT 
9527 lists it as a chronic and acute health hazard.38  Symptoms of exposure 
are listed as “central nervous system effects, nausea, vomiting, anesthetic or 
narcotic effects.”39  Regarding butoxyethanol exposure, “injury to red blood 
cells (hemolysis), kidney or the liver” may occur.40 
Soon after the catastrophe, Exxon responded by developing an 
improved dispersant that could dissipate heavier oils and even oils that had 
been exposed to the elements.41  This advanced dispersant, COREXIT 9500, 
was able to disperse oils that were previously considered to be 
undispersible in laboratory and tests conducted in the early 1990s.42  The 
first application of COREXIT 9500 was in the Sea Empress oil spill that 
occurred at the entrance of the Milford Haven Waterway in Pembrokeshire, 
Whales in 1996.43  Despite the final report deeming its application a success, 
the effectiveness was not reported due to a short observation window.44 
Although dispersants were only used in six of the seventy-seven oil 
spills in Europe from 1995-2005, those numbers reflect poor weather and 
sea energy conditions rather than an increasing aversion to use 
dispersants.45  It is noteworthy, however, that COREXIT dispersants were 
banned in the United Kingdom on July 30, 1998, after failing to pass the 
required rocky shore test indicating that crustaceans would not be able to 
properly adhere to rocks along the shore after exposure.46  However, the U.K. 
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. EIN Presswire, NOAA Official Asks EINNEWS to Withdraw Story Questioning
Safety of Gulf Seafood, PR-INSIDE, Nov. 5, 2010, http://www.pr-inside.com/noaa-official-
asks-einnews-to-withdraw-r2230792.htm. 
38. BP Gulf of Mexico Regional Oil Spill Response Plan, fig. 18-10.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Lessard & Demarco, supra note 1, at 62.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 63.
44. Id.
45. H. Chapman et al., The Use of Chemical Dispersants to Combat Oil Spills at Sea: A
Review of Practice and Research Needs in Europe, 54 Marine Pollution Bulletin 827, 838 
(2007). 
46. MARINE MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION, OIL SPILL TREATMENT PRODUCTS APPROVED 
FOR USE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 10 http://www.marinemanagement.org.uk/protecting/ 
pollution/documents/approval_approved_products.pdf. 
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is still allowing existing stockpiles of COREXIT to be used in offshore 
conditions.47 
A 2006 study has shown that some dispersants actually hinder native 
bacteria from consuming the oil.48  Although the surface-area-to-volume 
ratio is increased, the actual mechanism occurs via the specialized 
dispersant molecules which physically bind to the surface of the oil. 
Therefore, if those molecules remain bound to that surface, the bacteria will 
be sterically hindered from accessing it.  However, experiments showed that 
some dispersants even catalyze the consumption of oil by bacteria.49  Most 
surprisingly, this study also hypothesized that dispersant toxicity increases 
with exposure to sunlight.50 
D. Possible Future Controversy: Nanotechnology
The latest turn in the controversy over using dispersants to dissipate 
oil slicks is likely to center on the toxicity of the small-scale oil droplets, 
even in dilute quantities in the ocean.  Because real-time use of dispersants 
has not been studied extensively, it is still unknown just how small the oil 
droplets become after dispersion and possible subsequent partial 
consumption by bacteria.  It is very possible that they may become as small 
as the nanoscale.51  This may be problematic for several reasons.  
Within the past decade, research into nanotechnology has exploded. 
Materials can behave completely different at the nanoscale.52  For example, 
compounds that are normally solid at a larger scale can become liquid at 
the nanoscale and vice versa, even at the same temperature and pressure.53  
In particular, research has aimed to understand the large surface-area-
to-volume ratio phenomenon.  This phenomenon is unique to nanoparticles 
and is what gives unique properties to materials which utilize them.54  In 
47. Nalco Inaccuracy vs. Fact About COREXIT Products, http://www.nalco.com/
applications/4348.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
48. Committee on Understanding Oil Spill Dispersants: Efficacy and Effects
(National Research Council of the National Academies), Transport and Fate, Chapter 4, 
in Oil Spill Dispersants: Efficacy and Effects 135-192 (2006). 
49. Id.
50. Id. at 266.
51. See Ian MacDonald, Professor of Biological Oceanography, Address at
Florida State University: Energy, Oil, Emissions and the Future of Florida (Sep. 21, 
2010) (explaining that Southern Louisiana Crude Oil forms 100 µm droplets before 
reaching the surface of the ocean). 
52. Emil Roduner, Size Matters: Why Nanomaterials are Different, 35 Chem. Soc.
Rev. 583, 583 (2006). 
53. Id. at 586.
54. It has been found that composite materials exhibit superior properties
when nanoparticles are introduced into a matrix over those using macroparticles. 
For example, nanofluids, or fluids with nanoparticles dispersed throughout, exhibit 
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sum, the surfaces of materials possess a high surface energy due to the large 
amount of dangling bonds located there.55  More and more, researchers are 
gaining insight into this phenomenon and using it to engineer new 
materials. 
This does not mean, however, that researchers have sound 
understanding of how nanoparticles interact with both humans and animals. 
Nanoparticles are materials of any chemical composition that have a mean 
diameter of 10-9m or less.56  In other words, nanoparticles are 1000 times 
smaller than microparticles.  It has been hypothesized that nanoparticles, 
even those derived from traditionally nontoxic bulk materials, can enter the 
systems of humans and animals via their pore structures, ingestion, or 
inhalation.57  Once inside the bodies of humans or animals, much is still 
unknown about the effects of the presence of nanoparticles.  However, it is 
hypothesized that nanoparticles could wreak havoc on the human body 
since they are able to travel deeper into tissue and organs than larger 
particles.58 
Although studies into nanoparticle toxicity have been ongoing for the 
past few years, it is still difficult to precisely determine exactly what humans 
and animals can tolerate.59  The problem is that there is a plethora of both 
superior thermal conductivity over fluids with dispersed macroparticles.  The exact 
mechanism remains unknown.  See Yimin Xuan & Qiang Li, Heat Transfer Enhancement of 
Nanofluids, 21 Int’l Journal of Heat and Fluid Flow 58, 58 (2000). 
55. Dangling bonds are incomplete bonds.  These leave unpaired electrons at
the surface creating a localized high energy condition.  The smaller the volume of 
material, the more effective this localized surface energy becomes for a desired 
engineering purpose.  See K.K. Nanda et al., Higher Surface Energy of Free Nanoparticles, 
91 Physical Review Letters 106102-1, 106102-3 (2003). 
56. Cristina Buzea et al., Nanomaterials and Nanoparticles: Sources and Toxicity, 2
Biointerphases 17, 22 (2007). 
57. Armelle Baeza, Toxicity of Nanoparticles, Invited oral at E-MRS Fall Meeting
2008, Symposium D. 
58. We already know that even the now relatively large microparticles can
cause major health problems once inside the human body.  Take asbestos for 
example, where glass microparticles are able to travel far into the small capillaries of 
the lungs, thereby clogging them not only by themselves, but by the scar tissue they 
create along the way in. See Craig A. Poland et al., Carbon Nanotubes Introduced into the 
Abdominal Cavity of Mice Show Asbestos-Like Pathogenicity in a Pilot Study, 3 Nature 
Nanotechnology 423, 423 (2008). 
59. It is important to note here that it has also been hypothesized and studies
have shown that nanoparticles can have therapeutic effects on the human body as 
well.  For example, the ability of nanoparticles to cross certain organ barriers can 
make them useful as vehicles for drug delivery.  See Günter Oberdörster et al., 
Nanotoxicology, An Emerging Discipline Evolving from Studies of Ultrafine Particles, 
113 Environmental Health Perspectives 823, 824 (2005). 
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toxic and traditionally nontoxic materials to study at the nanoscale.60  This, 
coupled with other variables, such as the precise size of the nanoparticles, 
their concentration in the body, and which of the various biological 
processes they affect generates the need for more comprehensive studies in 
the future.61  Perhaps the biggest problem of all derives from the fact that in 
dilute concentrations, nanoparticles are extremely hard to detect.  Thus, 
prevention methods may not even be taken at all to prevent their entry into 
the human body. 
III. Existing Legal Framework
Unfortunately, oil spills are unexpected events that do not wait until
scientific research answers every lingering question about dispersants.  This 
section summarizes the current legal framework that gives U.S. officials the 
discretion to use dispersants in the event of an oil spill despite the current 
uncertainties and controversy with their use. 
A. Clean Water Act (1972 Amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act)
Under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), the President of the United States 
has a duty to create and publish a National Contingency Plan (“NCP”) for the 
removal of spills of oil and hazardous substances.62  The CWA also requires 
the President to revise the NCP.63  President George H. Bush delegated this 
authority to the Administrator of the EPA in an executive order announced 
on October 18, 1991.64  Under this executive order, the Administrator of the 
EPA also has a duty to perform all other functions vested in the President by 
§ 311(d)(1) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and § 4201(c) of the
Oil Spill Pollution Control Act of 1990.65
In general, the NCP “shall provide for efficient, coordinated, and 
effective action to minimize damage from oil and hazardous substance 
discharges, including containment, dispersal, and removal of oil and 
hazardous substances.”66  It establishes the National Response Team (“NRT”) 
60. Armelle Baeza, Toxicity of Nanoparticles, Invited oral at E-MRS Fall Meeting
2008, Symposium D. 
61. Id.
62. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(1) (2011).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(3) (2011).
64. Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 F.R. 54757.
65. Id. These functions include revising the NCP no later than one year from
the date of the executive order and to implement the amendments. 
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2) (2011).
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and RRTs for “planning and coordination of regional preparedness and 
response actions.”67 
Specifically, this plan must include “procedures and techniques to be 
employed in identifying, containing, dispersing, and removing oil and 
hazardous substances.”68  The plan must also provide a schedule of 
dispersants, if any, that may be used in the event of a spill.69  Finally, it must 
specify the quantities and locations for safe dispersant usage.70 
The NCP was written and published in 1968, approximately one year 
after the Torrey Canyon spill.71  It was first revised in 197372 as required by the 
CWA of 1972.73  Revisions were subsequently made in 1980 and 1990 in 
response to new legislation.74  It has not been updated since 1994 when it 
was amended for consistency with the Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”).75  Recall 
that the President has a duty to revise the NCP.76  However, the CWA only 
stipulates that “[t]he President, may from time to time, as the President 
deems advisable, revise or otherwise amend the National Contingency 
Plan,” thus rendering the duty discretionary.77  
B. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Drilling operators must also provide Oil Spill Response Plans of their 
own under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”).78  The OCSLA 
was enacted in 1953 after the Truman Declaration of 1945 claimed exclusive 
jurisdiction to the U.S. over oil and gas resources outside of the states’ 
territorial seas.79  Outer continental shelf (“OCS”) oil and gas leases are 
regulated under OCSLA.80  The four stages of the OCS leasing process are 
the leasing plan stage, the lease sale stage, the exploration stage, and the 
67. Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 F.R. 54757.
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(F) (2011).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(G)(i) (2011).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(G)(ii)-(iii) (2011).
71. 40 C.F.R. § 300 (2011).
72. Id.
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2011).
74. Id.; 55 F.R. 8666-01.
75. U.S. EPA National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan Overview, http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/lawsregs/ncpover.htm#key (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(1) (2011).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(3) (2011).
78. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2011).
79. JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 443 (3d ed. 2007).
80. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2011).
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development stage.81  The two stages of OCS leases this section will focus on 
are the exploration and development stages. 
The exploration stage refers to the preliminary and exploratory drilling 
afforded to OCS lessees under the OCSLA.82  This stage cannot commence 
until the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) approves an 
Exploration Plan (“EP”) submitted by the lessee operator.83  The EP must be 
accompanied by an approved Oil Spill Response Plan.84  The regional 
supervisor of the BOEM then has fifteen days to request additional 
information.85  Finally, the EP is sent to the governors’ offices and coastal 
zone management agencies of the potentially affected states.86  
The regional supervisor then has a thirty-day window to either approve 
or reject the EP or ask the operator lessee for corrections.87  An EP can only 
be rejected if it would “probably cause serious harm or damage to life 
(including fish or aquatic life) . . . or the marine, coastal, or human 
environment . . . and the proposed activity cannot be modified to avoid the 
condition(s).”88   
The subsequent development stage is the final stage of the OCS 
leasing administrative process and constitutes the actual production and 
development of oil and natural gas.89  Before this stage can commence, an 
operator lessee must submit a Development and Production Plan (DPP).90  
As with the submission of EPs during the aforementioned exploration stage, 
all DPPs must be accompanied by an approved Oil Spill Response Plan.91  
Interestingly, a DPP is only required for OCS development in what are 
known as frontier regions, or regions in which there has been no significant 
OCS development to date.92  Therefore, operator lessees in the Gulf of 
Mexico region are exempt from the requirement to submit a DPP.93  Instead, 
they are only required to submit what is known as a Development 
Operations Coordination Document (“DOCD”).94 This is a more abbreviated 
81. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 337 (1984).
82. Id. at 321. Also, Abbott v. BP Exploration and Production Inc. 781
F.Supp.2d 453, 463 (2011).
83. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (2011).
84. 30 C.F.R. § 550.219(a)(1) (2011).
85. 30 C.F.R. §§ 550.231 (a)-(b) (2011).
86. 30 C.F.R. §§ 550.232(a)(1)-(2) (2011).
87. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (2011).
88. 30 C.F.R. § 550.233(b)(3) (2011).
89. Tribal Vill. of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 1988).
90. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (2011).
91. 30 C.F.R. § 550.250(a)(1) (2011).
92. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (2011).
93. 30 C.F.R. § 550.201(a)(1) (2011).
94. 30 C.F.R. § 550.201(a)(2) (2011).
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plan.95  The regional supervisor then has a sixty-day window in which he 
must reject or approve the DOCD or ask for corrections.96  During this 
window, the regional supervisor may consider comments made by the 
governors of the affected state(s) and any other interested person(s).97 
Once an operator is approved to drill anywhere seaward of the 
coastline, they must submit an Oil Spill Response Plan for approval by the 
BOEM before actual drilling can commence from a facility.98  Overall, the 
plan must demonstrate the operator’s ability to respond quickly and 
effectively to an oil spill generated by the drilling facility.99  A facility, 
however, may begin operation upon submission of the plan provided the 
operator submits in writing that he is able to respond to a worst-case spill 
scenario.100  Thus, an operator can begin drilling before the Oil Spill 
Response Plan is even reviewed, let alone approved. 
The content of any submitted Oil Spill Response Plan must be 
consistent with the NCP and any applicable Area Contingency Plan(s) 
(“ACP(s)").101  The plan must “provide for [a] response to an oil spill from the 
[drilling] facility” with said response being immediately carried out in the 
event of a spill.102  However, the drilling operator shall take “all appropriate 
actions necessary to immediately abate the source of a spill and remove any 
spills of oil.”103 
The format of the plan must begin with an introduction and contents, 
followed by an emergency response action plan.104  The third and final 
section of the plan is the appendices, which must include a dispersant use 
plan appendix.105  The dispersant use plan must be consistent with the NCP 
product schedule and the corresponding ACP(s).106  “The plan must include: 
(a) An inventory and a location of the dispersants and other
chemical or biological products which [an operator] might use on
the oils handled, stored, or transported at the facility;
95. See MIN. MGMT. SERV., DEPT. OF INTERIOR, GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
REPORT/ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION FOR PLANS SUBMITTED IN THE GULF OF MEXICO OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF REGION 3-4.  
96. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(h)(1) (2011).
97. Id.
98. 30 C.F.R. § 254.2(a) (2011).
99. 30 C.F.R. § 254.1(a) (2011).
100. 30 C.F.R. § 254.1(b) (2011).
101. Id.
102. 30 C.F.R. § 254.5(a) (2011).
103. 30 C.F.R. § 254.5(c) (2011).
104. 30 C.F.R. § 254.21(b) (2011).
105. Id.
106. 30 C.F.R. § 254.27 (2011).
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(b) A summary of toxicity data for these products;
(c) A description and a location of any application equipment
required as well as an estimate of the time to commence
application after approval is obtained;
(d) A discussion of the application procedures;
(e) A discussion of the conditions under which product use may
be requested; and
(f) An outline of the procedures [an operator] must follow in
obtaining approval for product use.”107
C. Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990
The Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990108 overhauled previous federal 
cleanup and liability provisions pertaining to oil spills. Under OPA, the 
federal government has oil removal authority.109  Specifically, “[t]he 
President shall, in accordance with the National Contingency Plan and any 
appropriate Area Contingency Plan, ensure effective and immediate removal 
of a discharge, and mitigation or prevention of a substantial threat of a 
discharge, of oil or a hazardous substance” in the Gulf of Mexico.110  The 
President’s options for carrying out this duty are either cleaning up the spill 
via the federal government, monitoring the efforts of the oil company’s 
response, or to direct the oil company’s response.111  
D. Other Applicable Laws
More laws come into play during the aforementioned oil and gas lease 
approval process.  The Coastal Zone Management Act (“CZMA”)112 stipulates 
that a state may require more information than required by the BOEM 
regarding EPs and DPPs.113  Also, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(“NEPA”)114 applies to the approval of a DPP and stipulates that either an 
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) must be prepared or determined to 
107. 30 C.F.R. § 254.27(a)-(f) (2011).
108. 33 U.S.C. § 4201 (2011).
109. 33 U.S.C. § 4201(c)(1)(A) (2011).
110. Id.
111. 33 U.S.C. § 4201(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (2011).
112. 16 U.S.C. § 1451-65 (2011).
113. Robert B. Wiygul, The Structure of Environmental Regulation on the Outer
Continental Shelf: Sources, Problems, and the Opportunity for Change, 12 J. Energy Nat. 
Resources & Envtl. L. 75, 133 (1992). 
114. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et. seq. (2011).
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be unnecessary.115  Although they are routinely prepared in the California 
region, never has an EIS been prepared for Western or Central Gulf of 
Mexico regions.116  
IV. The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Need for a New
Legal Framework
A. The Disaster
On April 20, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform, located 
fifty miles southeast of the Mississippi River Delta, exploded.117  The 
platform was manufactured by Transocean and leased by BP.118  On April 22, 
the semisubmersible drilling platform capsized and sank along with the 
approximately 700,000 gallons of unburned oil.119  Several initial attempts at 
shutting-in the well were unsuccessful as crude oil and natural gas 
continued to escape uncontrollably from the riser pipe of the well.120  British 
Petroleum responded by applying COREXIT 9527, the same dispersant used 
in Exxon Valdez, until supplies were depleted.121  The remainder of dispersant 
application consisted of COREXIT 9500, which was developed in response to 
Exxon Valdez.122 
B. Dispersant Schedules
1. NCP Product Schedule
The EPA lists eighteen dispersants in the NCP Product Schedule.123  
Among these dispersants are COREXIT 9500 and 9527.124  Nalco Energy 
115. Wiygul, supra note 113 at 133.
116. Id.
117. NOAA Incident News, http://www.incidentnews.gov/incident/8220 (last
visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
118. David Pagaine, Deepwater Horizon Contract Extended, OFFSHORE, Nov. 1, 2009,
http://www.offshore-mag.com/index/articledisplay/6112303380/articles/offshore/ 
volume-69/issue-11/departments/gulf-of_mexico/gulf-of_mexico.html. 
119. NOAA Update 22 Apr 10, PM. http://www.incidentnews.gov/entry/526081
(last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
120. Id.
121. EIN Presswire, NOAA Official Asks EINNEWS to Withdraw Story Questioning
Safety of Gulf Seafood, PR-INSIDE, Nov. 5, 2010, available at http://www.pr-
inside.com/noaa-official-asks-einnews-to-withdraw-r2230792.htm.  British Petroleum 
is now BP. 
122. Id.
123. U.S. EPA, National Contingency Plan Product Schedule, 
http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/ncp/product_schedule.htm (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2011). (The NCP Product Schedule lists 18 dispersant products, 14 of which 
are unique chemical formulas. Therefore, some may report that there are only 14 
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Services, L.P. is listed as the manufacturer and primary distributer of both 
dispersants.125  Provided in the schedule are the toxicity and effectiveness of 
each dispersant.126 
Toxicity values are given using LC50 values in parts per million (ppm). 
The LC50 value represents the dose lethal to fifty percent of the population of 
a particular species after a specific testing duration.127  Therefore, the lower 
the LC50 value, the more toxic the dispersant.  The only two species used in 
the toxicity tests were Menidia (silverside fish) and Mysidopsis (Mysid 
shrimp).128  The length of the Menidia and the Mysidopsis tests were ninety-
six hours and forty-eight hours, respectively.129  COREXIT 9500 is listed as 
having an LC50 value of 2.61 ppm for the Menidia test and 3.40 ppm for the 
Mysidopsis test.130  These values represent the lowest LC50 values for the 
Menidia test and the ninth lowest for the Mysidopsis test.131  COREXIT 9527 
is listed as having an LC50 value of 4.49 ppm for the Menidia test and 6.60 
ppm for the Mysidopsis test.132  These LC50 values represent the second 
lowest for the Menidia test and the sixth highest for the Mysidopsis test.133 
Effectiveness values were generated using a swirling flask dispersant 
effectiveness test performed on South Louisiana and Prudhoe Bay crude 
oils.134  They are given in percentages.  To qualify for inclusion into the NCP 
product schedule, a dispersant must have an effectiveness value of at least 
forty-five percent.135 COREXIT 9500 is 54.70 percent effective on Southern 
Louisiana crude oil, and COREXIT 9527 is 63.4 percent effective on the 
same.  This renders fifteen of the eighteen dispersants in the schedule more 
dispersants listed in the NCP Product Schedule. The newest revision of the NCP 
Product Schedule also claims to only contain 14 dispersants in its initial summary 










133. Having the second lowest LC50 value for the Menidia test does not bode
well, considering that the lowest value belongs to the dispersant that was developed 
X years later as an improvement over this one. 
134. ASTM, F2059-06 Standard Test Method for Laboratory Oil Spill Dispersant
Effectiveness Using the Swirling Flask, http://www.astm.org/Standards/F2059.htm (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2011).  This test is the standard test for dispersant effectiveness as 
provided by the American Society for Testing and Materials.  
135. 40 C.F.R. § 300.915(a)(7) (2011).
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effective than COREXIT 9500, and twelve of the eighteen dispersants listed 
more effective than COREXIT 9527 on Southern Louisiana crude oil.136 
Most notable in the schedule are the 100% effectiveness values for 
DISPERSIT SPC 1000 and the SEACARE E.P.A. dispersants on Southern 
Louisiana crude oil.  Both dispersants have the same LC50 values for each of 
the two toxicity tests and are less toxic that either COREXIT dispersant in 
both tests.137  
2. BP’s Gulf Of Mexico Regional Oil Spill Response Plan
BP’s Gulf Of Mexico Regional Oil Spill Response Plan is a 582-page 
document that was issued on December 1, 2000.138  The latest revision at the 
time of the Deepwater Horizon explosion was made on June 30, 2009, with 
the next review date scheduled for June 30, 2011.139  The Dispersant Use Plan 
(“DUP”) consists of forty-one pages.140 
The DUP begins by explaining the aforementioned basics of 
dispersants: effectiveness and toxicity.141  Toxicity data are provided only for 
the two COREXIT dispersants on marine species determined to be the most 
at risk for the negative impacts of dispersant application.142  These species 
were chosen because they are known to be “present at the water surface 
and/or in the upper water column.”143  However, these data are only provided 
for four marine species: two species of shrimp and two species of fish.144  
The next set of data provided in the DUP is for dispersant 
effectiveness.145  The results are from a swirling flask dispersant effectiveness 
test performed on South Louisiana and Prudhoe Bay crude oils.146  Again, 
only data for the COREXIT dispersants are provided.  The chart lists 
COREXIT 9500 as 54.7 percent and 45.4 percent effective on South Louisiana 
136. Included in the 12 more effective dispersants is COREXIT 9500.
137. National Contingency Plan Product Schedule, supra note 123.  These
values are 7.90 ppm for the Menidia test and 8.20 ppm for the Mysidopsis test. 
138. British Petroleum, Gulf of Mexico Regional Oil Spill Response Plan (2009),
available at http://publicintelligence.net/bp-gulf-of-mexico-regional-oil-spill-response-
plan/ [hereinafter BP’s Response Plan]. 
139. Id.
140. Id. at § 18.
141. Id. at §§ 18(A)-(D).
142. Id. at § 18(C).
143. Id.
144. Id.  The species of shrimp are Artemia salina (brine shrimp) and
Mysidopsis bahia (mysid shrimp).  The species of fish are Menidia beryllina (inland 
silverside) and Fundulus heteroclitus (mummichog). 
145. Id. at § 18(D).
146. ASTM, supra note 134.  This test is the standard test for dispersant
effectiveness as provided by the American Society for Testing and Materials. 
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Crude oil as provided by the vendor lab report and the EPA Office of 
Research and Development report, respectively.147  The results listed for 
COREXIT 9527 are 63.4 percent and 31 percent, respectively.148  Thus, the 
effectiveness data obtained by the vendor lab report are identical to that 
provided in the EPA’s NCP Product Schedule, yet the data provided by the 
EPA’s own Office of Research and Development Report provide effectiveness 
values that are 9.3 percent and 32.4 percent lower for COREXIT 9500 and 
9527, respectively.  It is highly doubtful that these discrepancies are within 
any scientific margin of error.  Perhaps most importantly, the thirty-one 
percent effectiveness value reported for COREXIT 9527 in the EPA’s own 
Office of Research and Development Report is below the forty-five percent 
threshold value for inclusion in the NCP Product Schedule.149 
Next, the DUP provides guidelines for making the decision to use 
dispersants.150  First, the application methods and equipment are listed.151  
The only two methods provided are aerial dispersant application and marine 
dispersant application.152  Aerial dispersant application involves the spraying 
of dispersant onto the ocean’s surface via an aircraft, while marine 
dispersant application involves the same, only from workboats.153  The aerial 
dispersant application option is listed as one of the methods preapproved 
by the RRT.  Approval by additional agencies is required prior to the 
initiation of marine dispersant application. 
The Dispersant Inventory for the Gulf Coast consists of only four of the 
eighteen dispersants on the NCP schedule.154  The dispersants accounted for 
in the quantities available at specific stockpile locations are: COREXIT 9500, 
147. British Petroleum, supra note 139.
148. Id.
149. 59 F.R. 47394 (1994).  The NCP Product Schedule lists 7 dispersants with
effectiveness values less than forty-five percent in an individual test. However, the 
Product Schedule also includes an average effectiveness value for each dispersant 
using the values reported in the tests on Prudhoe Bay and Louisiana crude oils.  No 
average effectiveness values listed are under forty-five percent.  Assuming that the 
NCP threshold is forty-five percent for this average value, COREXIT 9527 was only 
51% effective on Prudhoe Bay crude oil according to the EPA Office of Research and 
Development Report, thus yielding an average effectiveness value of only forty-one 
percent.  Thus, this value still stands below the forty-five percent threshold 
requirement.  Of course, there is the possibility that a typographical error switched 
the values for the two reports in the BP Response Plan.  Environmental Protection 
Agency, National Contingency Plan: Product Schedule (2011), available at http://www. 
epa.gov/osweroe1/docs/oil/ncp/schedule.pdf. 
150. BP’s Response Plan, supra note 130 at §§ 18(E)-(H).
151. Id. at §§ 18(E)-(F).
152. Id. at § 18(F).
153. Id.
154. Id. at fig.18-2.
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COREXIT 9527, SPC 1000, and BIO Disperse.155  The total amount of 
dispersant stockpiled accounted for in this document is 174,486 gallons.156  
The quantities of SPC 1000 and BIO Disperse combined only account for a 
mere 1,265 gallons, or 0.72 percent, of this total.157  The remaining stockpiles 
listed are for the COREXIT dispersants.  Although the title of the inventory is 
“Dispersant Inventory – Gulf Coast,” it lists stockpile locations as far as 
Maine, Hawaii, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.158 
The MSDSs for COREXIT 9500 and 9527 dispersants account for the 
last twenty-one pages of the DUP.159  Every page of the MSDSs provided for 
the COREXIT dispersants prominently displays the Nalco company 
trademark.  Both MSDSs list a portion of the dispersants as proprietary 
ingredients.  Regarding toxicological information, both MSDSs state that “no 
toxicity studies have been conducted” on either product.  No MSDSs are 
provided for any other dispersants. 
C. The Response
NOAA provided oil spill trajectories and weather forecast support to 
the newly established Unified Command responsible for coordinating the 
response.160  The initial trajectory on April 22 estimated that the oil would 
remain offshore for at least seventy-two hours.161  By April 23, “scattered 
black oil and sheens” had been observed extending several miles from the 
site of the incident.162  On this day, a new oil spill trajectory estimated that 
oil would not reach land through at least April 27.163   
At this time, it is unclear exactly when BP initiated the use of 
dispersants. Most media reports reveal the aerial application of dispersants 
on May 3 with a report of the Department of Defense providing BP with two 
C-130 cargo aircraft with dispersant application capabilities on May 1.164
Approximately one week earlier, however, NOAA, in their April 23 advisory





159. Id. at figs.18-9 & 18-10.
160. NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration, NOAA Update 22 Apr 10, PM.,
http://www.incidentnews.gov/entry/526081 (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
161. Id.
162. NOAA Update 23 April 2010, AM., http://www.incidentnews.gov/entry/
526105 (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
163. Id.
164. US Oil Production, Shipping Unaffected by Spill So Far, AFP, (May 1, 2010),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hew_8EkXXu79vuYRZ96WrFW
DzQOw. 
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several vessels already staged in the surrounding area of the incident, most 
likely indicating that marine dispersant application had already 
commenced.165  This advisory update was the first mention of dispersant 
application by NOAA.166 
BP’s use of dispersants, however, was not limited to their application 
at the ocean’s surface. Subsurface use of dispersants was employed at the 
wellhead itself to disperse the escaping oil well before it could surface.  It is 
also unclear when this method was initiated, but, on May 14, it was reported 
that the EPA approved this method of dispersant application after three 
tests.167  Then, BP also began monitoring oil droplet particle size and the 
amount of dissolved oxygen in the water column.168  The EPA posted the first 
of this data on May 17 and continued to release data daily until August 10, 
noting that there was no indication of significant effects on marine life and 
that the decrease in oil droplet particle size was a good indicator that the 
dispersant was working.169  
It may come as a surprise, then, that on May 20, thirty-one days after 
the leak began, the EPA issued a directive to BP requesting that the 
company cease the use of the COREXIT dispersants in favor of less toxic 
alternatives on the NCP Product Schedule.170  On May 20, the EPA and the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) wrote a letter to BP requesting 
that they make all known information on the spill available to the public.171  
The company did not, however, switch to safer dispersants, citing availability 
issues.172  The letter also stated that although the government was unaware 
of any confidential business information (“CBI”) belonging to BP, that any 
CBI would be treated subject to applicable law.173 
165. NOAA Update 23 April 2010, AM., available at http://www.incidentnews.gov/
entry/526105 (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
166. NOAA INCIDENT NEWS, http://www.incidentnews.gov/browse/entries/8220/
response/by-date (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
167. The Associated Press, Some Oil Spill Events from Friday, May 14, 2010, ABC
News Money, May 14, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10649335. 
168. U.S. EPA, BP’s Analysis of Subsurface Dispersant Use, http://www.
epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants-bp.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
169. Id.
170. EPA DISPERSANT MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT DIRECTIVE (2010), http://www.
epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/directive-addendum2.pdf. 
171. LETTER FROM JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY AND LISA P. 
JACKSON, EPA ADMINISTRATOR TO DR. TONY HAYWARD, BP GROUP CHIEF EXECUTIVE (2010) 
http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/bp-hayward-dhs-epa.pdf. 
172. LETTER FROM DOUGLAS J. SUTTLES, BP CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER TO REAR
ADMIRAL MARY LANDRY, COMMANDER, EIGHT COAST GUARD DISTRICT AND SAMUEL COLEMAN,
DIRECTOR, SUPERFUND DIVISION U.S. EPA REGION 6 (2010)  http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/ 
dispersants/5-21bp-response.pdf. 
173. LETTER FROM JANET NAPOLITANO, supra note 171.
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BP and Nalco used the CBI defense to refrain from disclosing the 
information and data on the COERXIT dispersants.  The EPA responded by 
looking to § 14 of the Toxic Substances Control Act to compel BP to disclose 
the information.174  In June 2010, a class action lawsuit was filed by 
Louisiana residents against BP and Nalco for their use of dispersants in the 
Deepwater Horizon response.175  Eventually, the ingredients were made 
public, but not the exact amounts.176  The company provided the EPA with 
the proportions but asked that they be kept from the public for proprietary 
reasons.177  
D. Cleanup to Date and the Aftermath
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill released approximately 185 million 
gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico making it the largest marine oil spill 
since the inception of the petroleum industry and twenty times the amount 
spilled in Exxon Valdez.178  Current estimates indicate that a total of 1.9 
million gallons of COREXIT dispersants were sprayed in the Gulf.179  This is 
over ten times the amount of stockpiled COREXIT dispersants accounted for 
in BP’s Response Plan.180  
The dispersants were applied on the surface and underwater at the 
wellhead for nearly all of the eighty-four days the oil escaped uncontrollably 
from the Macondo well.181  According to the EPA, the dispersion of the oil at 
the wellhead was successful.182  It has been reported that the resulting 
174. OMB Watch, As EPA Takes Action, Trade Secrets Continue Threatening Health and
Safety, June 2, 2010, http://www.ombwatch.org/node/11045. 
175. See Complaint for Damages, Parker v. Nalco Co., (2010) (No. 10-01749)
(E.D. LA) available at www.courthousenews.com/2010/06/17/Disperse.pdf. 
176. Nalco COREXIT Ingredients, http://www.nalco.com/news-and-events
/4297.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
177. Id.
178. Campbell Robertson & Clifford Kraus, Gulf Spill is the Largest of Its Kind,
Scientists Say, THE NEW YORK TIMES, August 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08 
/03/us/03spill.html?_r=2&fta=y. 
179. Dahr Jamail, BP Dispersants “Causing Sickness,” ALJAZEERA, Oct. 29, 2010,
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2010/10/20101027132136220370.html. 
180. See BP Gulf of Mexico Regional Oil Spill Response Plan, supra note 38, at
fig. 18-10. 
181. Surface application began on at least May 3rd. Subsurface application
was monitored by the EPA from May 17th to August 10th. 
182. BP’s Analysis of Subsurface Dispersant Use, EPA (Oct. 14 2011), http://www.
epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants-bp.html. 
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underwater plumes of oil have dissipated and were most likely eaten by 
bacteria.183 
Unfortunately, the best predictors of the effects of an oil spill of this 
magnitude stem from studying the aftermath of an actual disaster of 
comparable size.  Therefore, we must seize this opportunity to learn all we 
can about exactly what happened in this spill in order to not only respond 
more efficiently to future events but to prevent them from occurring in the 
first place.  Fortunately, scientific research into the use of dispersants in this 
spill has already begun. 
It has been known that light, sweet, Louisiana crude oil is known to 
form 100 µm droplets of oil.184  A mass of oil droplets this size behaves like a 
cloud with different density fronts in the water column.185  Eventually, the 
droplets will spread out and then join together locally into mats which are 
typically what one sees at the ocean surface when a spill has occurred.186  It 
is here that the oil becomes heavily emulsified.187 
The aforementioned masses of oil droplets, or deepwater plumes were 
also discovered.188  However, studies have shown that the plumes did not 
disappear as was previously reported.189  Instead, they simply moved.  Thus, 
the oil was not eaten by bacteria. Dr. Ian MacDonald, Professor of Biological 
Oceanography at Florida State University, has twenty-five years experience 
in analyzing samples collected from underwater seeps in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Dr. MacDonald collected samples from the Gulf in the aftermath of the spill 
and used gas chromatography to detect the presence of n-alkanes.  These 
straight chain compounds are easily cleated, and therefore consumed by 
bacteria first.  Gas chromatography results showed the presence of n-
alkanes, thus indicating that bacteria were not consuming the oil.190  At this 
time it is unknown whether a reservoir of native bacteria exists in the Gulf to 
biodegrade the oil. 
183. Jeffrey Kofman, BP Oil Spill: Undersea Plumes Nowhere to be Found as Tests Show
Seafood to be Safe, ABC WORLD NEWS, July 30, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/gulf-oil-
spill-oil-plumes-eaten-bacteria-tests/story?id=11292159. 
184. Ian MacDonald, Professor of Biological Oceanography, Address at Florida




188. Christine Dell’Amore, Giant Underwater Plume Confirmed – Gulf Oil Not
Degrading, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC DAILY NEWS, Aug. 19, 2010, http://news. 
nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/08/100819-gulf-oil-spill-bp-underwater-plume-
science-environment/. 
189. Terry C. Hazen et al., Deep Sea Oil Plume Enriches Indigenous Oil-Degrading
Bacteria, 330 Science 204, 207 (2010). 
190. Ian MacDonald, Professor of Biological Oceanography, Address at Florida
State University: Energy, Oil, Emissions and the Future of Florida (Sep. 21, 2010). 
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One of the biggest concerns of scientists and environmentalists thus 
far is the lack of evidence of dead animals.191  Although this would be 
assuring to the general public, it does not tell the whole story of how the 
ecosystem has been or will be affected in the future.  Instead, the real 
measure of the effects of an environmental disaster is the effect on overall 
activity and biodiversity.192  Even a fifteen percent reduction in overall 
activity and biodiversity can be considered a large deficit.193  The worst-case 
scenario would result from tipping effects.  Tipping effects are 
environmental events that lead to an irreversible consequence and are most 
likely to occur when an ecosystem is already stressed.194  This occurred in the 
aftermath of Exxon Valdez where the herring fishery was closed, and after 
being reopened for one year the fishery crashed.195  Before the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion, sperm whales were considered to be subject to tipping 
effects based on their population.196  Bluefin tuna, an endangered species, 
are also subject to tipping effects as they spawn in the summer within the 
area of the spill.197  A loss of a large number of fish from a single year-class 
would pose a threat to the species.198 
On October 27, 2010, Al Jazeera reported on the effects of the COREXIT 
dispersants in the Gulf region.199  Their article reports hemorrhaging in 
dolphins and humans.200 It is highly likely that the dispersants are to blame 
because hemorrhaging in animals is the dispersion of bodily fluids.201  There 
are also reports by fishermen who volunteered in the cleanup effort of 







197. Mark Schleifstein, Bluefin Tuna Particularly Vulnerable to Gulf of Mexico Oil Leak,
NOLA.COM (May 13, 2010), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/ 
bluefin_tuna_particularly_vuln.html. 
198. Id.
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Oil and Dispersants in the Gulf Waters, GULF OIL DISASTER RECOVERY (Aug. 22, 2010), 
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V. The Response to the Response: Foundations for a New
Legal Framework
A. National Contingency Plan Revision under the CWA
Since its inception in 1968, the NCP has only been revised four times. 
The last revision was made on September 15, 1994.203  Again, recall that the 
President has discretion to revise the NCP under the CWA, but only as 
deemed advisable.204  As outlined earlier, each revision was in response to 
new legislation.  Since new legislation is typically a response to a recent oil 
spill, it appears that the government has gotten into the habit of reviewing 
the NCP not only when it has to, but also when it has to in response to an 
environmental disaster.  This is an unsustainable way of ensuring that 
government agencies are best prepared for an unexpected oil spill. 
Therefore, it is highly recommended that the EPA review the NCP by 
mandate at least once every ten years.  
Specifically, the NCP should be amended to include at least some sort 
of toxicity threshold.205  As mentioned before, the only threshold is that a 
dispersant possesses an effectiveness value of forty-five percent.206  Further, 
the CWA and the NCP should provide for a mechanism for the EPA to 
remove dispersants.  Although it is obvious from a glance at the NCP 
Product Schedule that dispersants have been removed, and in some cases 
relisted, there is no provision in the NCP that provides a regular review of 
the listed dispersants based on scientific and environmental studies which 
are published quite frequently these days.207  In fact, many dispersants have 
been removed simply because they have been discontinued by their 
manufacturers.208  
The NCP Product Schedule was revised on October 28, 2010, and 
includes the COREXIT 9500 and 9527 dispersants used by BP in the 
Deepwater Horizon response.209  The NCP Product Schedule Technical 
Notebook was also revised on October 28, 2010, and recommends the 
application of 2-10 gallons per acre, or a 1:50-1:10 dispersant-to-oil ratio, for 
203. 59 F.R. 47394 (1994).
204. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(3) (2011).
205. Or, more specifically, an effectiveness-to-toxicity ratio.
206. 40 C.F.R. § 300.915(a)(7) (2011).
207. COREXIT 9527 was removed on 03/10/78 and relisted on 12/18/95.
COREXIT 9500 was removed on 04/13/94 and was also relisted on 12/18/95. Recall 
that COREXIT 9527 was applied in initial dispersant tests from March 25-28, 1989 in 
the Exxon Valdez response.  
208. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN: PRODUCT
SCHEDULE (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/docs/oil/ncp/schedule.pdf. 
209. Id.
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both dispersants.210  If current estimates are correct that 185 million gallons 
of oil escaped from the Deepwater Horizon rig and the Macondo well, BP’s 
addition of 1.9 million gallons of the COREXIT dispersants comes out to 
approximately a 1:100 dispersant-to-oil ratio.  Although this amount is well 
below the EPA’s suggested quantity, never has this vast quantity of 
dispersants ever been used.  Additionally, the NCP Product Schedule 
Technical Notebook only discusses aerial and boat applications of all listed 
dispersants.211  Therefore, the EPA is most likely assuming that the 
dispersants will remain near the surface of the ocean as opposed to miles 
below where most marine life dwell.  
There is no precedent or data available for the application of 
dispersants at the wellhead.  Unfortunately, the Deepwater Horizon disaster 
is probably the best source of data available assuming it can be studied 
properly.  Although the University of South Florida has sent out research 
vessels into the Gulf, it may be years before the effects of this quantity of 
dispersants and their subsea application are fully understood.212 
In the meantime, Senator Frank Lautenberg has introduced legislation 
titled the Safe Dispersants Act.213  This proposed legislation would provide 
for stricter testing before a dispersant can be included in the NCP Product 
Schedule as well as a toxicity threshold as proposed here earlier.214  Stricter 
tests would include long-term tests in addition to the swirling flask tests 
that only examine toxicity in a few short days.215  They would also include 
testing of more than just the two species currently tested by the EPA.216 
 The Better Oil Spill Response Plan Act of 2010217 was introduced by 
Representative Edward Markey and proposes to amend the CWA to require 
the President to provide Area Committees with the worst possible oil 
discharge scenario possible in each area covered by an ACP every five years. 
If the worst-case scenario were to change, the President would be required 
to revise the NCP.218 
210. GUIDE TO USING THE NCP PRODUCT SCHEDULE NOTEBOOK (2010),
http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/oil/ncp/notebook.pdf  
211. Id.
212. Vickie Chachere, R/V Weatherbird II To Return Friday, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH
FLORIDA NEWS (Sept. 2, 2010), http://usfweb3.usf.edu/absoluteNM/templates/ 
?a=2670&z=123. 
213. S. 3661; H.R. 6119, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010). available at
http://lautenberg.senate.gov/assets/dispersants.pdf. 
214. Senator Frank R. Lautenberg Press Release, http://lautenberg.senate.gov/
newsroom/record.cfm?id=326743 (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
215. Id.
216. Menidia (smallfish) and Mysidopsis (shrimp).
217. H.R. 5608 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010).
218. Id.
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B. Oil Spill Response Plan Review Process under OCSLA
It is now well known that BP’s Gulf Of Mexico Regional Oil Spill 
Response Plan contained typographical errors and outdated information.219  
For example, it lists resources for the rescue of several species of animals 
that are not even present, let alone native to the Gulf region.220  It also lists a 
scientist who was deceased four years before the latest revision.221  Although 
this is suggestive of BP’s reuse of information from response plans in other 
drilling regions, it may be unreasonable to imagine that the thirty day period 
in which the regional supervisor of the BOEM has to review the details of 
BP’s 582-page response plan is sufficient to catch everything.  Further, the 
oil spill response plan is only a portion of the EP that is reviewed in this 
window.  
Currently, there is proposed legislation to change the OCS oil and gas 
lease approval process.  The Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic 
Resources (“CLEAR”) Act222, introduced by House Natural Resources 
Committee Chairman Nick J. Rahall, would amend the OCSLA to increase 
the review period for BOEM approval from thirty days to ninety days.  In 
addition to the extension of time for the BOEM to review operator response 
plans, the lenient regulations for the Gulf of Mexico region also need to 
become more stringent.  As of now, there is a sixty-day period in which the 
BOEM regional supervisor has to approve the abbreviated DOCDs allowed 
for this region, yet only a thirty-day period to review EPs.  Extending the 
review period for EPs should be sufficient to eliminate the errors in 
approved Oil Spill Response Plans.  Additionally, doing away with DOCDs 
altogether in favor of DPPs for the Gulf of Mexico region should also be 
considered along with a sufficient to review period for the lengthier DPPs. 
Perhaps most importantly, an operator should no longer be allowed to 
proceed with oil and gas drilling prior to the approval of an Oil Spill 
Response Plan. 
The decision to use dispersants and select the proper products is a 
difficult decision that has to be made quickly at the onset of a spill. 
Therefore, response plans need to convey as many dispersant options as 
219. Andrew Clark, BP Contingency Plan for Dealing With Oil Spill Was Riddled With
Errors, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jun/09/ 
bp-oil-spill-contingency-plan. 
220. BP’s Gulf Of Mexico Regional Oil Spill Response Plan, fig. 11-3. (The
species listed are sea lions, seals, sea otters, and walruses.) 
221. Domenick Pilla, BP’s Emergency Plan: Dead Scientist to Rescue Non-Existent
Otters and Walruses, EXAMINER, (June 10, 2010), http://www.examiner.com/cultural-
issues-in-national/bp-s-emergency-plan-dead-scientist-to-rescue-non-existent 
otters-and-walruses-6-live-feeds. Peter Lutz is listed as a National Specialist in 
Wildlife and Marine Life in Appendix F of BP’s Response Plan. 
222. H.R. 3534, 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010).
 West  Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 1, Winter 2012 
89 
possible.  The BP Response Plan only listed toxicity and effectiveness 
information and the MSDSs for Nalco’s COREXIT dispersants.  Other 
dispersants provided in the stockpile listings of available dispersants likely 
to be used in a response consisted of a dismal 0.72 percent of the total 
quantity listed.  Even a thorough reading of the DUP gives the impression 
that the COREXIT dispersants are the best and most widely available 
dispersants in the Gulf of Mexico Region.  Therefore, in addition to the 
extension of the approval window, additional criteria for approval need to be 
provided.  For example, requiring an operator to provide the entire NCP 
Product Schedule in the response plan would show an initial decision maker 
all of the available options.  This is not likely to present a burden on 
operators or the initial decision maker because the NCP Product Schedule 
only lists eighteen dispersants and already provides the data for their 
toxicity and effectiveness.  Another example would require operators to list 
all of the available quantities of each NCP approved dispersant within a 
reasonable distance of the drilling operation.  This would also show the 
initial decision maker a wider variety of dispersants to choose from, 
assuming that most are regionally available.  This is also not likely to 
present a burden on operators, at least in light of the fact that BP listed 
stockpiles of COREXIT as far away as Singapore and the United Kingdom. 
C. Best Dispersants Available
BP used the dispersants developed for heavier oils on a light crude oil 
without considering the more effective, less toxic dispersants on the NCP 
Product Schedule.  If the oil rigs themselves need to be operated using the 
best available and safest technology under the OCSLA, then why can’t the 
equipment and chemicals used to recover any escaped oil also be of the 
best available technology (i.e., the best combination of effectiveness and 
toxicity)?223  The CWA has a similar requirement for pollutant control. 
Specifically, it requires the best available technology economically feasible 
for the control of pollutants classified as toxic and nonconventional.224  
In the end, BP used an estimated 1.9 million gallons of the COREXIT 
dispersants during the Deepwater Horizon response.  Prior to the explosion, 
they had only stockpiled less than ten percent of this amount as indicated in 
their Oil Spill Response Plan.  Therefore, BP had to order more dispersants. 
Thus, although it may be burdensome for an operator to immediately locate 
available dispersants in the wake of a spill, it was likely not a burden for BP 
to seek safer dispersants at the time it had to order more.  Therefore, the 
requirement to use the best dispersants available can be a flexible, tiered 
system depending on the circumstances at the time dispersants are sought. 
223. 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (2011).
224. 40 C.F.R. § 125.3 (2011).
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Because this would likely create a scenario in which COREXIT dispersants 
only accounted for 10% of the total amount of dispersants used, opponents 
of using COREXIT dispersants in particular are likely to be pleased.225 
Finally, the President should be given more authority to change the 
dispersant schedule when feasible during an oil spill response.  Expanded 
authority would especially be needed when new information on dispersants, 
and even new dispersants themselves, has arisen since the last revision of 
the NCP Product Schedule. 
D. Transparency in the Oil Spill Response Process
Although BP eventually submitted the ingredients of the COREXIT 
dispersants used in the Deepwater Horizon response to the EPA, the 
information is inadequate without their precise proportions.  Under the 
proposed Better Oil Spill Response Plan Act of 2010, the President cannot 
place a new dispersant on the NCP Product Schedule unless the 
manufacturer publicly discloses the constituent ingredients.226  The 
proposed Safe Dispersants Act would require not only the public disclosure 
of ingredients of dispersants, but their exact quantities as well.227  It is 
important to note, however, that public disclosure of proportions of 
ingredients may provide a disincentive for private entities to develop better 
dispersants. 
VI. Conclusion
Dispersants have been controversial in oil spill response efforts
because of their toxicity.  The most recent chapter in the controversy arises 
from their use in unprecedented quantities in the Gulf of Mexico in response 
to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill including their application at the 
wellhead.  Almost instantly, BP was subject to harsh scrutiny by 
environmentalist groups for their decision to use dispersants.  Much of the 
outcry was based on the aforementioned toxicity-effectiveness issue 
regarding dispersant use and that BP was basically trying to keep the oil out 
of sight to avoid more economic rather than environmental damages.228  BP 
225. This rationale assumes that there are no chemical incompatibilities
between the initial dispersant used and the new dispersant being sought. We know, 
however, that despite the similar product name, the ingredients of both COREXIT 
dispersants used by BP contained different ingredients. It is therefore likely that 
combined use of other dispersants would be safe.  
226. H.R. 5608 111th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2010).
227. S. 3661; H.R. 6119 111th Cong. (2010) available at http://lautenberg.senate.
gov/assets/dispersants.pdf. 
228. Margaret Cronin Fisk, BP, Nalco Sued Over Dispersant Used in Gulf Spill
(Correct), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, June 18, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2010-06-18/bp-nalco-sued-over-dispersant-used-in-gulf-spill-correct-.html. 
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has specifically come under fire by environmentalists for referring to 
dispersants as detergents.  But that is precisely what they are, only more 
toxic than cleaning agents approved for household use. In lay terms, 
detergents used in the home disperse oil and dirt particles throughout the 
water being used, be it bathwater, water in the kitchen sink, or water in a 
washing machine. 
Environmentalists would point out that the distinction, however, is 
that all of the aforementioned water containers have drains to remove the 
unwanted oil, dirt, and detergent while the ocean does not. Plus, they would 
point out that there are no living organisms in the water.  Proponents of 
dispersant use would argue that the vast ocean is sufficient to dilute the 
unwanted chemicals and native bacteria will consume the oil faster because 
of the increased surface-area-to-volume ratio provided by the newly formed 
oil droplets. 
Until scientific research can support a definite decision to cease the 
use of dispersants, they remain a viable option in responding to an oil spill. 
Although they are approved by the U.S. government, a new legal framework 
is necessary to ensure that only the best dispersants are used and that they 
are used responsibly. 
As underscored throughout this paper, perhaps the best estimation on 
the effects of future dispersant use is to study an actual response.  This is 
because it is hard to determine exactly what will happen in a spill such as 
Deepwater Horizon.  Or is it?  In recent weeks, it has been discovered that 
what is known as Operation Deep Spill was carried out prior to the disaster. 
In 2000, off the coast of Norway, BP, with the knowledge of the U.S. 
government, conducted a real-time experiment using a wellhead that was 
strategically leaking oil from the ocean floor.229  It is alleged that the 
experiment revealed the presence of underwater oil plumes.230  This prior 
knowledge may bring to the surface a need for more changes to the existing 
legal framework regarding oil spill preparedness and response.  For example, 
operators may be held responsible for monitoring underwater plumes in 
light of the fact that BP most likely knew beforehand that they would form. 
This paper has proposed a new legal framework to address regulatory 
gaps in the oil spill response process regarding dispersants.  First, requiring 
the revision of the NCP would keep the NCP Product Schedule in harmony 
with the latest dispersant technology.  Requiring stricter toxicity testing with 
a reasonable toxicity threshold requirement will yield a product schedule 
with only the safest, most effective dispersants commercially available. 
Since underwater use of dispersants is unprecedented, new effectiveness 
229. Ian MacDonald, Professor of Biological Oceanography, Address at Florida
State University: Energy, Oil, Emissions and the Future of Florida (Sep. 21, 2010). 
230. Id.
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studies should be conducted for use in such an environment, and these 
values should also be reported in the NCP Product Schedule. 
Next, the Oil Spill Response Plan review process under the OCSLA 
should be amended to provide ample time to review the large and 
scientifically detailed response documents that are required as part of the 
oil and gas leasing process.  Extending the window for approval from thirty 
days to at least ninety days would provide sufficient time for review. 
Additionally, a new requirement that the entire NCP Product Schedule be 
listed in an operator’s Oil Spill Response Plan should not impose a burden 
on operators since there are only eighteen dispersants currently approved by 
the EPA.  This would prevent an initial responder from unnecessarily 
thinking they may only have between two and four dispersants to choose 
from. 
Further, the proposed legal framework aims to give more flexibility in 
the selection and use of dispersants in the oil spill response itself.  If better 
dispersants become available or new quantities of dispersants must be 
ordered after an initial response, operators should be required to acquire 
only the best dispersants available.  This flexibility would be most effective 
in responses to spills such as Deepwater Horizon where very large quantities 
of dispersants may be utilized. 
Finally, a transparency requirement would ensure that all of the 
ingredients as well as their proportions are disclosed.  A requirement of 
disclosure to the general public would harm the dispersant industry and 
may have a chilling effect on the development of safer, more effective 
dispersants.  However, a requirement to disclose such information to the 
EPA would ensure that the information is at least reviewed by a regulatory 
agency while still eliminating any chilling effect.  This is imperative because 
it would be a moot point to implement a new legal framework to promote 
the use of the best dispersants available if that framework would hinder the 
development of new and improved dispersants. 
